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The numerous valuable studies that have appeared in the last two or three
decades have contributed much to our knowledge of the Spartan kings
and helots. These studies have generally treated both groups as distinct
members of Spartan society, in separate discussions1. There is, however,
a moderate amount of evidence that links the kings and the helots in a
special manner. A close examination of this evidence, such as it is, may
allow certain conclusions which cast some new light on the relationship
of both groups with one another. Given the nature of our information
about all things Spartan, some of these conclusions will have to remain
more or less hypothetical.
We may begin with a brief survey of what is known about the origin
and ethnic affiliation of the helots. The helots were the native inhabitants
of the land called Laconia. The thesis that the majority of all helots were
Messenians cannot be upheld; for Thucydides the helots were the Laconian
helots2. With regard to race or ethnicity the helots were Greeks: in explaining
1 E.g.: CARTLEDGE P. Spartan Reflections. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2001;
IDEM. Sparta and Lakonia.2 L., N.Y., 2002; CARTLEDGE P. and SPAWFORTH A.
Hellenistic and Roman Sparta.2 L., N.Y., 2002; CLAUS M. Sparta. München, 1983;
DUCAT J. Les Hilotes. Paris, 1990; HODKINSON S. Property and Wealth in
Classical Sparta. Classical Press of Wales, 2000; The Shadow of Sparta. Ed.
by Powell A. and Hodkinson S. L. and N.Y., 1994; Sparta New Perspectives.
Ed. by Hodkinson S. and Powell A. Classical Press of Wales, 1999; LAZEN-
BY J.F. The Spartan Army. Warminster, 1985. I wish to express my gratitude to
Andrei U. Eremin who read this paper in typescript and offered very helpful
suggestions and criticism which which greatly improved the article.
2 LURAGHI N. Helots Called Messenians? A Note on Thuc. I.101.2 // CQ. 2000.
Vol. 52. P. 591. If I understand him aright, Figueira (FIGUEIRA T. The Evolution
of Messenian Identity // Sparta New Perspectives. Ed. by Hodkinson S. and
Powell A. Classical Press of Wales, 1999. P. 215 sq.) also distinguishes be-
tween Laconian and Messenian helots. He believes that Thucydides looks at
the Messenians from two perspectives, as “Messenians” when they are on
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who should ideally work as farmers Aristotle says that agricultural laborers
should be slaves, as at Sparta, but they should not be of the same stock
(µϕυλοι), which they were in Sparta, because as Greeks such slaves
would be men of spirit and therefore dangerous. From the point of view
of history and chronology the ancestors of the helots were the Proto-
Greeks living in the Bronze Age: Athenaeus quotes Theopompus as saying
that the Spartans took their helot population from the Greeks who had
inhabited the land before the Spartans, i.e. from the Proto-Greek population.
As regards language, researchers have proved the presence of Proto-
Greek formations in the epigraphical evidence for the cults practiced by
the historical helots. This indicates that some features of the cults belonging
to the historical helots were remnants of the Bronze Age religion. It is not
impossible that the helots’ everyday talk in the fifth century still contained
Linear B words. The thesis of an Achaean helot descent, based on the
testimony mentioned above and on linguistic research, has been generally
accepted3.
Ephorus says that an early Spartan king, Agis I, created the institution
of helotry. The historicity of this information has been doubted4, almost
certainly with good reason, but here it is not so much the historical truth
the side of Athens; as “helots,” when seen in their social milieu, a useful
distinction at least as far the understanding of Thucydides is concerned.
3 Athen. 6. 265b-c = FgrHist 115 Theopomp. F 122. Arist. Pol. VII.10.1330a25-
30; II.6.1.1269a29–169b12. For references to studies of pre-Doric elements in
the language  of the helots see: LOTZE  D. Metaxy eleutheron kai doulon.
Studien zur Rechtsstellung unfreier Landbevölkerungen in Griechenland bis
zum 4. Jh. v. Chr. Wiesbaden, 1979. S. 26–28; 71–79. See further: M ICHELL H.
Sparta. Cambridge, 1952. P. 76 ff.; CLAUS. Op. cit. S. 109 f.  CARTLEDGE.  Sparta
and Lakonia. P. 82–87 voices some skepticism but accepts the Achaean de-
scent of the helots. Ephorus FgrHist 70 F 117 says that at the arrival of the
Spartans the Achaeans left Laconia, but he undermines his credibility in this,
when he asserts the same of the Eleans, in which he is demonstrably mis-
taken. Theopompus’ testimony has therefore been preferred by all; cf. Lotze,
loc. cit. Despite his error, Ephorus agrees with Theopompus to the extent that
Achaeans lived in the later Lacedaemon, and that a change in their fortunes
occurred when the Spartans arrived. Luraghi (LURAGHI N. Helotic Slavery
Reconsidered // Sparta. Beyond the Mirage. Ed. by Powell A. and Hodkinson
S. The Classical Press of Wales, 2002. P. 227) following DUCAT (Op. cit.  P. 181
f.) advances a new theory of his own and claims that there is little support in
the evidence for an Achaean origin of the helots. He completely ignores the
Theopompus fragment which is explicit and unambiguous, and which can
hardly be made to mean anything else than that the helots were the descen-
dants of the Achaeans. Surely a straightforward piece of ancient evidence
such as this is preferable to a modern theory, no matter how acutely argued.
4 FgrHist 70 Ephor. F 117. Kiechle (K IECHLE F. Agis // Der kleine Pauly. 1964)
calls Ephorus’ report unhistorical and a later invention.
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that is important. What matters is that Ephorus recorded a Spartan tradition,
whether true or not, that Agis I was the originator of helotry. Other links
between the kings and the helots are present in fifth-century and later
sources. According to Herodotus it was compulsory for the helots to
attend the funeral of a king. This mandatory inclusion is surely remarkable;
it has led Kiechle to surmise that the helots’ relationship with the kings in
earlier times was of a quite different sort than their later relationship with
the representatives of the Spartan citizen body, by which he evidently
means the ephors and the gerousia, and that the earlier condition of the
helots was better than it was in the classical period. His conjectures, in
support of which Kiechle cites a similar opinion of J.J. Wells, would seem
to be right on the mark5.
Against this background, the dealings of the ephors with the helots
about which we have information were uniformly either repressive or
punitive. The gerousia, too, is not known for having had a benign attitude
towards the subjected class, nor is there any record of their having
improved the helots’ condition or having advocated such an improvement.
Although occasional closer ties between individuals of both classes are
recorded, the relationship between the Spartan homoioi as a whole and
helots was sometimes one of mistrust; there were occasions when Spartan
hoplites had to take precautions against them in the field6.
In contrast, as will be shown in greater detail in the following
paragraphs, a king could take personal charge of the helots, helots could
serve as the personal bodyguards and confidants of royal persons, and, if
some recent writers are right, kings or their surrogates could advocate
the liberation of deserving helots.
The closest and most regular contact between the two was in the
army during military operations abroad. If we are to believe the travel
writer Pausanias, helots fought in Sparta’s armies as early as the first and
second Messenian Wars. Pausanias adds that it was the poet Tyrtaeus
who enrolled helots in the regiments to replace the fallen Spartans7. What
is more certain is that from that time onwards until the end of the third
century B.C. we encounter helots or newly liberated citizen helots
(neodamodeis) in the expeditionary forces and on the battlefields of Sparta.
They served in the army in various capacities on at least twenty-seven
separate occasions for which there is good evidence, and on many more
where their service may safely be assumed. In some of these campaigns
the entire Spartan force consisted of helots or neodamodeis or both8.
5  Hdt. VI.58; KIECHLE F. Lakonien und Sparta. München, Berlin, 1963. S. 160 f.
6 E.g.: Thuc. IV.80.2; Critias. Fr. 37 (DK); but see: DUCAT. Op. cit. P. 146 f.
7 Paus. IV.11.1; 16.6.
 
8 See: WELWEI  K.-W. Unfreie im antiken Kriegsdienst I: Athen und Sparta.
Wiesbaden, 1974. S. 108–192 passim and LAZENBY. Op. cit. passim who be
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War by its nature tends to create a bond between commanders and
their troops; this is true to a certain extent even in the huge armies of
modern times. In antiquity the bond was created by the proximity in which
both lived and fought, but much more because both must depend on each
other for survival. The commander had to look out for all his soldiers, no
matter how lowly their social class might be, if he hoped to be victorious.
The soldiers, for their part, owed him loyalty, obedience, and the readi-
ness to fight courageously and well. The bond created by this enforced
reciprocity was present to some extent even in the case of mercenaries.
The helots, however, were not mercenaries. They were a part of
Spartan society in which they had a stake, no matter how abused they
may have been by their Spartan masters. The kings, and eventually the
commoners who began to command them in the later fifth century,
established a close contact with them while in the field, both on an official
and on a personal level. The closeness between kings and helots is best
attested for the early fifth century. The evidence for that period led
K.O.Müller to observe that the kings appear to have had a greater and
more direct authority over the helots in the army than over the rest of the
troops under their command9. Herodotus certainly gives this impression
in his reports about Cleomenes I; it is also certain that in later times too the
kings continued to exercise direct command over the helots, as they did
over all other formations of the army10.
During the Spartan campaign against Argos Cleomenes I added to
his previous acts of impiety by giving orders to the helots that violated the
religious sensibilities of the Greeks in general, and those of the Spartans in
particular. When the Argives whom he had defeated fled to the grove
sacred to Argos, the eponymous hero of the land, Cleomenes ordered the
helots in his army to pile wood around the grove and to set it on fire11. He
thus committed two acts of sacrilege at one and the same time. It was
sacrilegious to destroy trees sacred to a deity: numerous ‘sacred laws’
impose penalties for harming the vegetation in sanctuaries12. Secondly,
tween them have collected all the passages in the sources recording the
presence of helots and neodamodeis in the army. Helots and neodamodeis
alone: e.g. Thuc. VII.19.3; Xen. Hell. III.4.2; VI.5.24.
9 MüLLER K.O. Geschichte hellenischer Stämme und Städte. Graz, 1969. Vol. II,
III. S. 33.
10 CARTLEDGE. Spartan Reflections. P. 61.
11 Hdt. VI.80.
12 JORDAN B. and PERLIN  J. On the Protection of Sacred Groves // GRBS
Monographs. 1984. Vol. 10. P. 153–159. Herodotus (VI.75.3; VI.84.1) reports
an Argive and a Spartan explanation of Cleomenes’ madness and wretched
end. According to the former both were punishment for the atrocities he
committed in the sacred grove. The Spartans   attributed them to Cleomenes’
drinking  undiluted wine.  Why the pious Spartans for once preferred a secu-
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Cleomenes was guilty of the murder of the suppliants standing under the
protection of a divinity. Cleomenes, Herodotus continues, next sent a large
part of his army back to Sparta, retaining only 1,000 of his troops and all
the helots. With these he proceeded to the Argive Heraeum intending to
offer sacrifice. When the priest refused to give him permission, Cleomenes
ordered the helots to drag the priest from the altar and to flog him13.
The helots cannot but have been fully aware of the sacrilegious nature
of the king’s commands. There is no doubt at all that they possessed a
developed religious sensibility: they worshipped Poseidon at Taenarum, a
sanctuary peculiarly, although not exclusively, their own, they participated
in the celebration of the Hyacinthia, and they were present at the funeral
rites for the kings14 . Nevertheless, they obeyed the atrocious orders of
Cleomenes to the letter, promptly, and without demurring. That it was not
impossible for them to remonstrate, at least initially, is suggested by the
refusal of the helot, who later stood guard over Cleomenes in the stocks,
to give the king a knife. The guard finally obeyed, but only when Cleomenes
threatened to punish him severely after his release15.
These episodes tell us something about the fidelity and obedience
that helots rendered to a king of Sparta, at least in the earlier part of the
fifth century. A notice in a lexicographer very likely makes reference to
the helots who obeyed Cleomenes in this episode and burned the grove of
Argos: ‘Argeioi: the trustworthy of the helots were called Argeioi’16.
Cleomenes of course had always been somewhat strange in the head,
and, as his terrible suicide shows, was quite mad at the end of his life. He
did, however, have his lucid periods. It was during one of these that he
made the ‘characteristically Spartan’ observation that Homer was the poet
of the Spartans because he teaches men how to fight, but Hesiod was the
poet of the helots because he tells them how to farm17. If there is any truth
to this anecdote, it shows that a Spartan king could regard the helots not
merely as farm laborers and soldiers to be exploited, but as human beings
having a not inconsiderable mental capacity and worthy of the sympathetic
reflection and characterization by a king. The episode also suggests that
the helots had a far greater share in Spartan and Greek culture than has
been supposed18.
lar to a supernatural explanation is an interesting question.
13 Hdt. VI.81.
14 Taenarum: Thuc. I.128.1; Hyacinthia: Athen. IV. 139 sqq.; royal funerals: Hdt.
VI.58.3. cf.: DUCAT. Op. cit. P. 118.
15 Hdt. VI.72.2.
16 Hesych. Lex. s. v. ’Αγοι.
17 Aelian. VH. XIII.19; Plut. Mor. 223a.
18 The helots apparently knew the Iliad, too. They express the wish to eat the
Spartans raw at Xen. Hell. III.3.6, which is a close echo of Il. IV.34. Cf.:
HORNBLOWER S. The Greek World 479–323 B.C.  L., N.Y., 1991. P. 100.
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The casual manner in which Herodotus reports that it was a helot
who watched Cleomenes tied up in the stocks suggests that helots routinely
provided body guards for the kings when the latter were not on campaign.
Another instance of helots acting as the body guards of a royal person is
present in the report of Herodotus about Cleomenes’ colleague and enemy
Demaratus. When the pursuing Spartans caught up with the fugitive former
king on the island of Zacynthus, they took away his therapontes, who
were his helot body guard, and then arrested him19.
Several respectable scholars maintain that at the time of the battle of
Marathon or very shortly before it Cleomenes made common cause with
the helots and attempted to stir them into rebellion by way of advancing
his own ambitious plans. There appears to be no direct support for his
soliciting the helots in the sources, and the thesis has been challenged by
several historians20. One skeptical authority has argued that the Spartans
would not have allowed a helot to guard Cleomenes if they had suspected
him of plotting with the helots21. But by the time the king was in the
stocks he was too demented to conspire with anybody; the helot most
probably was posted at his side to prevent something of the kind that
actually occurred. If Cleomenes did in fact attempt a coup d’état, it is
quite likely that he involved the helots in it; everything in his career and
character, as well as his attitude towards the helots points in that direction22.
There is no such uncertainty in the case of the next royal person of
ability and ambition, the regent Pausanias, who also had revolutionary
plans in which he involved the helots. When the defeated Persians
abandoned the battlefield of Plataea they left behind a huge amount of
treasure: gold and silver, implements and furniture, women and animals.
It was enough to pay for three expensive dedications, and to distribute
awards to the thousands of soldiers who fought in the battle23. In Greek
warfare captured property became the spoils of the victors who collected
it for sale at auction or for some other appropriate disposition. In the
Spartan army the booty was brought to the booty sellers (λαϕυ	οπλαι)
who were magistrates attached to the staff of the king; they took charge
of the collected spoils and arranged for the sale24.
19 Hdt. VI.70.2; for the therapontes being helots see: How and Wells II on
IX.28.2.
20 The most detailed and extensive case for Cleomenes’ plotting with the helots
is that made by HUXLEY G.L. Early Sparta. Cambridge, Mass., 1962. P. 87–96.
A critical discussion of the views of scholars who have argued this point
both pro and con may be found in OLIVA  P. Sparta and her Social Problems.
Amsterdam, Prague, 1971. P. 146 f.
21 OLIVA . Op. cit. P. 147.
22 Cf.: HORNBLOWER. Op. cit. P. 21.
23 Hdt. IX.80 sq.
24 Xen. Lac. 13.11; Agesil. I.18 f.; cf.: PRITCHETT W.K. Ancient Greek Military
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As commander-in-chief of the Greeks at Plataea Pausanias did not
follow the normal procedure in the matter of the booty. He issued a
proclamation that no one was to touch it, and then ordered the helots in
the Spartan army to collect it. The helots collected the booty, handing
over much of it, but also stealing what apparently was an equal amount.
Herodotus says that they stole everything that they could hide. It is unlikely
that all of the thousands of helots present at Plataea participated in the
collecting and stealing. Nevertheless the value of what they stole must
have been enormous. Herodotus claims that when the helots sold the stolen
treasure to the Aeginetans, who paid for it with brass, the gold became
the foundation of the later great wealth of the island25. This origin of
Aegina’s prosperity is regarded by commentators as a scandalous and
malicious invention of the island’s arch enemy, Athens26. That it contains
invention is plausible enough; all the same, as with most exaggerations,
there is probably a large kernel of truth in it. Macan rightly observes that
in selling to Aegina the thieving helots sold cheap, not because they did
not know the difference between gold and brass, but because they had to
get rid of the stolen goods as quickly as possible27. In any case it should
not be in doubt that the value of the loot that the helots stole was
considerable.
It is most unlikely that a theft on such a large scale, perpetrated by so
many persons, and followed by the sale of so many valuable objects to a
sovereign state could have remained undetected for very long. Eventually
it became common knowledge; this is shown by the fact that Herodotus’
informants learned about it later. It is still more improbable that Pausanias
himself did not hear about the theft and sale at some point. Yet he took no
steps to recover the booty and did nothing to punish the thieves. His
failure to take action against them is that much more remarkable because
the helots acquired much of their loot by stripping the Persian corpses of
their chains, bracelets, and gilded daggers, a practice which according to
Aelian was strictly forbidden to ‘Laconian men’28.
The regent’s inaction may have been a sign of approval, perhaps
even a silent compliment to the helots, for the efficiency with which they
put to use a skill regarded by the Spartans almost as a virtue. The helots
Practices. Part I. Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1971. P. 90.
25 Hdt. IX.80 sq.
26 E.g. by HOW AND WELLS  1989 ad loc.
27 MACAN R.W. Herodotus. The Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Books. L., 1908 ad
loc.
28 Aelian. VH VI.6. Under the regime of austerity the ac-quisition of ostentatious
wealth was prohibited upon; in view of this fact there is no reason to doubt the
veracity of Aelian’s statement. If the Spartans were forbidden to strip the dead,
it would be odd if the helots were permitted to do it.
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stole well for they were not caught in the act; and good stealing for the
Spartans was good work deserving a reward. In the Anabasis Xenophon
says to Cheirisophus:
For as I hear, Cheirisophus, you Lacedaemonians, at least those
among you who belong to the peers, practice stealing from childhood,
and count it not disgraceful but honorable to steal anything that the
law does not prevent you from taking29.
Whether or not with his inaction Pausanias wished to honor the
Spartan tradition of stealing and to commend the helot practitioners of the
art, he certainly was giving them a signal that they had nothing to fear and
would be spared any punishment. Pausanias, however, may have had a
much weightier and more serious motive, which was to earn the gratitude
and good will and thus the help and cooperation of the helots. In the
fourth century Agesilaos II, while campaigning in Asia Minor, employed
the same tactic to win the loyalty of his friends and allies, to ensure their
cooperation, and to bind them closely to himself. Xenophon relates that
the booty that Agesilaos captured was so large that it was selling for next
to nothing at auction. Agesilaos therefore advised his friends to buy, telling
them that soon he would be taking his army down to the coast, where
they could resell the goods at a profit. The friends followed his advice and
made large amounts of money at the resale. On this occasion the booty
sellers took part in the transactions; later on, Agesilaos allowed his friends
and allies to seize and sell the plunder directly without intermediaries. In
this way, Xenophon concludes, the king acquired many followers eager
for his friendship30.
It is virtually certain, therefore, that in showing himself tolerant and
forgiving at Plataea Pausanias had more in mind than recognizing the helots’
skill. He was taking a deliberate first step to secure the cooperation of the
helots in his plans to make himself master of Greece at some time in the
not-too-distant future. That this is what he had in mind is supported by
the fact that his efforts to ingratiate himself with the helots paralleled his
efforts a little later on to gain the support of the Persians for his ambitious
schemes.
Less than a year after the battle of Plataea Pausanias captured
Byzantium and began his campaign to win over the Persians to his plans
which included giving the Great King Greece itself; as at Plataea, the
regent was giving things away. When he was recalled to Sparta in 478/77
B.C., the ephors’ allegations against him were at first collaboration with
the Persians and tyrannical ambitions31. Gradually, however, the ephors
29 Xen. An. IV.6.15 (Loeb translation); cf. Xen. Lac. 2.7 sq.
30 Xen. Agesil. I.18 sq.
31 Thuc. I.94.2; 95.3; 5; 128.3–7; 129; 131.1; 132.4.
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began to discover that Pausanias was plotting with the helots as well32.
Having earned their loyalty at Plataea with his paternalistic treatment of
them he now proceeded to enlist their active participation in his plans by
promising them freedom and citizenship in return for helping in their
realization. This, Thucydides says, was a fact3 . The regent’s machinations
paid off; the helots believed his promises. A good indication of his close
collaboration with them is the place where Pausanias was finally betrayed,
the sanctuary of Poseidon at Taenarum. The precinct was the principal
place of worship of the helots, and it also served as their place of refuge
from persecution. Evidently the ephors had learned that Pausanias was in
the habit of meeting with his helot allies at Taenarum and so they set their
trap there. They arranged for the meeting with Pausanias’ confidant and
messenger, a ‘man from Argilos,’ to take place in the sanctuary so as not
to arouse the suspicions of the regent. It has always been assumed that
Pausanias’ friend came from the town called Argilus in eastern Macedonia.
But since he met his master in Poseidon’s sanctuary at Taenarum, there is
a high probability that the man was a Laconian helot. A Laconian inscription
containing a sacred law from the early fifth century mentions an obe
named Arkalia or Argalia; it lay close to Amyclae and Sparta-town. It is
more than likely that not knowing the name of the obscure Spartan obe,
the copyist of Thucydides’ text remembered the name of the much better
known city in Macedonia, which Thucydides mentions several times, along
with its inhabitants, the Argilioi34, and changed the alpha in the name to an
iota, turning Pausanias’ helot into a man from Argilus. The name of the
obe may also have had the variant Argilia, to judge from Argileonis, the
name of Brasidas’ mother. In short, the man was not from the north, but
came from a local obe and was a helot35. Meeting his confidant in the
usual place, Pausanias for his part felt as secure in the interview with him
as he had on previous occasions36.
The proposal made a long time ago to connect the machinations of
the regent Pausanias with the great revolt in 465 B. C. is in all likelihood
correct37. The promises of Pausanias to the helots remained unfulfilled,
causing lingering resentment which led to the uprising. In its aftermath
32 Note the imperfect πυνϑνοντο at I.132.4.
33 Thuc. I.132.4.
34 Thuc. IV.103.3; V.6.5; 18.5.
35 Thuc. I.132.5–133. See BEATTIE  A.J. An Early Laconian Lex Sacra // CQ. 1951.
Vol. 1. P. 49–58; PORALLA P. and BRADFORD A.S. A Prosopography of
Lacedaemonians.2 Chicago, 1985. P. 25, ¹ 110; FRASER P.M. and MATTHEWS E.
A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names. III. A. Oxf., 1997. s. n.
36 Thuc. I.128.1 shows that helots congregated in the sanctuary at Taenarum, in
this case as suppliants.
37 See the references to, and discussion of, this proposal in OLIVA. Op. cit. P. 151.
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the relations between the Spartans and their helots worsened considerably38.
It is certainly to the period of mistrust after the great revolt that Thucydides
refers when he says that a great concern of the Spartans always was to
be safe from the helots. This concern surely is also the cause for the
disappearance of the 2,000 helots that the historian reports. Whatever else
we may make of the episode, what Thucydides says about them implies
that these helots had proved to be brave and able fighters, who had a high
opinion of themselves and of their accomplishments, for which they
expected to receive proper recognition. These qualities and expectations
were in fact the reason for their liquidation39.
 We are not told who commanded the 2,000 and in what battle. Thucy-
dides, who usually reports only the bare facts of the commander’s name,
the makeup of the army, and the name of the locality of the battle, is
completely silent in this case. Also absent from the sources, with a very
few exceptions, are reports of a personal touch and an interaction of the
kings with the helots similar to those practiced by Cleomenes and Pausanias
in the previous period. The absence of such reports is probably to be
explained by the different principles in the selection of facts adopted by
Thucydides; that he has no details of king-helot relations during the
Peloponnesian War does not necessarily mean that such relations did not
exist.
It is however a fact that the first Spartan king after the regent Pausanias
who had dealings with the helots fought not together with them, but against
them. He was Archidamus II who suppressed the revolt of 465 B.C.40.
Helots must have served regularly under his command during the periodic
invasions of Attica in the early part of the Peloponnesian War named after
him, and it has been rightly assumed that helots must have been called up
for service on many other occasions during the war41. Agis II had helots
with him in the battle of Mantineia, and so did Agesilaos in the fourth
century42.
There is some reason to believe that in the second half of the fifth
century, perhaps beginning with the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans
adopted a new policy with regard to the military service of the helots,
which may have contributed to the absence of reports about collaboration
38 Plut. Lyc. 28.6.
39 Thuc. IV.80.2–5; see the discussion in the notes of HORNBLOWER S. A Com-
mentary on Thucydides. Oxf., 1996. Vol. II ad loc.
40 Diod. Sic. XI.63.1–7.
41 LAZENBY. Op. cit. P. 59. The capacity in which they served is a subject of
debate; see: WELWEI. Op. cit. P. 110. Different from Lazenby, who I believe is
right, Welwei tends to minimize service as hoplites; the helots, he thinks,
served mainly as auxiliaries and batmen.
42 Thuc. V.57.1; 64.2; Xen. Hell. III.4.2.
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between kings and helots. The new policy consisted of two changes which
appear to have been introduced in order to increase the safety of the
Spartans from revolts.
The first change, observable during the Peloponnesian War, was to
appoint with gradually increasing frequency commoners, rather than kings,
as commanders of army units containing helots or former helots. The
most notable example of this innovation is Brasidas in 424 B.C.43. In 413
B.C. the commoner Ekkritos commanded a force sailing to Sicily, while in
409 B.C. the commander defending Byzantium was Clearchus. Another
commoner, Thibron, held command in Asia Minor. Other non-royal
commanders of helots in the fourth century were Eudamidas, Ischolaos,
and Lysander44.
The explanation of this change is to be sought, first of all, in the need
for more than two field commanders in the course of a prolonged war,
fought on several fronts. As the kings could not be everywhere, officers
of lesser rank came to command garrisons and territories of varying sizes
abroad. Smaller army units did not require commanders of high rank,
such as a king. In 413 B.C., for example, Agis II appointed two lower-
grade officers to command ca. 300 neodamodeis on Euboea. After the
war Sparta, the ‘super power’ of the time, had to defend interests and
positions in many places of the Greek world with detachments similar to
that on Euboea45, which required a still larger numbers of lower-grade
commanders.
Whatever the reasons for it may have been, the shift in commanders
had the effect of removing the kings, whose authority in the field was
formidable46, from the command of helots as much as possible and so
deprived them of opportunities to court and win the helots for their schemes
as Pausanias had done at Plataea. From now on, his example became
more and more difficult to follow.
During the first decade of the Peloponnesian War the Spartans received
yet another powerful reminder of the need to prevent the association of
royal commanders and helot troops and so to forestall any potential for
trouble. This was the example provided to them by Brasidas and his helot
hoplites. The strength of the bond that this able and charismatic general
could forge with his soldiers, regardless of their social class, is evident
from the name by which they came to be called, the soldiers of Brasidas,
Brasideioi47. The name shows how closely these helots came to be identified
43
 
Thuc. IV.78.1; 78.4; V.34.1; 67.1; 71.3; 72.3.
44 Eccritus: Thuc. VII.19.2; Clearchus: Xen. Hell. I.3.15; Thibron: Xen. Hell. III.1.4;
Eudamidas: Xen. Hell. V.2.24; Ischoalus: Xen. Hell. VI.5.24; Lysander: Aelian.
VH. XIII.19.
45 Thuc. VIII.5.1.
46 Hdt. VI.56.
47 Thuc. V.34.1.
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with a commander who had earned the respect and allegiance of his army,
both free and unfree. Brasidas was not of royal stock, but he belonged to
the high nobility and functioned, so to speak, as a surrogate king. The
honorific appellation Brasideioi parallels the Argeioi of Cleomenes I; both
express the mutual reliability and solidarity between a general and his troops.
According to Thucydides the Spartans decided to give the Brasdeioi
freedom and permission to live wherever they liked. Somewhat later they
settled them at Lepreon, on the border of Elis, which Sparta disputed with
Elis. The historian adds that Brasidas’ helots were to live alongside other
liberated helots, whom he had not mentioned earlier. Besides the liberated
helots already present, however, Lepreon and its vicinity, being on the
periphery of Laconia, were also inhabited by perioikoi. This raises the
question what lands were given to the settlers, whose number was
substantial. We may take it for granted that neither the new nor the old
neodamodeis displaced any of the perioikoi. The answer therefore may
be that the Brasideioi settled and worked on lands owned by the kings, to
whom, as Xenophon informs us, the Lycurgan constitution assigned choice
farm country in the outlying regions among the perioikoi48. If the thesis
of helot veterans settling in royal domains is correct, it reveals routine
connections and associations between the Spartan kings and masses of
helots outside of service in the army. Helots in small numbers worked the
land of all Spartans, but it was only the kings with whom large groups of
helot farm workers stood in relationships of mutual interest in peace time
as they had in war.
The sources afford a second and more persuasive piece of evidence
that, as the Peloponnesian war continued, the change in command was,
among other things, also a precautionary measure against royal plots.
Where the sources state the composition of military forces, the helots
begin to be replaced as hoplites by neodamodeis. The expeditionary force
to Sicily under Ekkritos in 413 B.C. appears to be the last contingent in
which unfree helots served as hoplites, along with neodamodeis. The force
48 Xen. Lac. 15.3. Lepreum: Thuc. V.31.1; 34.1; 49 sq.; 62.  As neodamodeis
means new citizens, the helots clearly acquired some sort of citizenship.
Andrewes (HCT IV on Thuc. V.34.1) denies that the freed helots became full
citizens, without explaining just what he means by a full citizen. He is incor-
rect in saying that the service of the 2000 vanished helots (Thuc. IV.80.3 sq.)
was not necessarily hoplite service. Everything that Thucydides says about
them suggests that they fought as hoplites; cf.: JORDAN B. The Ceremony of
the Helots in Thucydides // L’Antiquité Classique. 1990. Vol. 59.
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49 Xen. Hell. III.4.2 (neodamodeis with Agesilaos to Asia); Hell. VI.5.24 f. (troops
on the border); Hell. VI.5.28 sq. (promise of freedom). See also Xen. Hell.
V.2.24; Diod. Sic. XV.65.6.
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sent to Euboea in 413 B.C. consisted of neodamodeis, as did the force in
Byzantium in 403 B.C. In 400/399 B.C. Thibron had 1,000 neodamodeis
with him, while in 396 B.C. Agesilaos commanded 2,000 of them in Asia
Minor. The troops guarding the borders of Sparta in 370 B.C. were
neodamodeis, and when the Thebans threatened to invade Sparta in the
same year, the helots were promised freedom for defending the country
before the battle, rather than after it49. One important purpose of this
promise and of the new policy in general very likely was to secure the
loyalty of the helots by giving them a stake in the free community, although
we do not hear of massive helot desertions from the ranks of the army in
the field under the command of a king or commoner. The desertions that
took place when Athenians forces invaded Spartan territory from the sea
during the Peloponnesian war appear to have been members of the civilian
working force, farmers, laborers, and the like50.
Another aim of the new system evidently was to remove the bargaining
chips of freedom and emancipation from the hands of the kings. Employing
liberated helots became the regular practice and was widely and well known
as such. In 374 B.C. Polydamas of Pharsalus addressing the Spartan as-
sembly took it for granted that if the Spartans should be at all willing to
render assistance, they would send an army of neodamodeis under the
command of a commoner rather than of a king, and he argued against it:
And I believe that if you send a force such as shall seem not only to
me,but also to the rest of the Thessalians, large enough to make war
upon Jason, the cities will revolt from him; for all of them are afraid of
the lengths to which the man’s power will go. But if you imagine that
neodamodeis and a private individual (i.e. not a king) as commander
will suffice, I advise you to do nothing51.
Sparta’s new policy, then, consisted of two features which reinforced
each other. Removing as much as possible the kings from command of
larger helot units also removed the possibility of plots. Freeing the helots
first, on the other hand, gave them less reason to conspire with the kings
and to assist them in their revolutionary plans in return for gaining in the
future what they already possessed at present.
We next hear about a personal touch in the relations between kings
and helots in an anecdote related by Aelian. It concerns Agesilaos II, who
accepted a gift of ordinary foodstuffs, but declined an offer of sweets,
pastries, and perfume as unfit for a Spartan. When pressed to accept
51 Xen. Hell. VI.1.14. Cf.: HORNBLOWER. The Greek World. P. 21, who thinks
that Spartans with political influence wanted to free a number of helots, so as
to have extra manpower for the army: ‘King Kleomenes, Pausanias the Re-
gent and the late fifth-century general Brasidas all had plans of this kind.’
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these delicacies, Agesilaos asked that they be given to the helots, for it
was better to corrupt them than Spartans and their kings52. Agesilaos’
request has been interpreted as an example of the contempt with which
the Spartans always treated the helots53. Agesilaos may have intended to
convey some contempt, but his remark sounds good-natured; after all
giving someone fine food cannot be said to be very insulting, especially
when the quality of Spartan army rations is taken into account54. The
statement may also be viewed as a display of the self-discipline and will-
power of the Spartans and their kings, qualities in which both took great
pride. On the other hand, we may also interpret it as approving and
complimentary, for that the helots could be corrupted, implies that they
were as sound as the Spartans themselves to begin with.
It is interesting that the same story was told about Lysander, who
was Agesilaos’ ally in the succession crisis of 400 B.C. Agesilaos contested
the succession to the throne of his brother Agis with Agis’ son Leotychides
who was reputed to be the son of Alcibiades and so ineligible55. According
to Duris of Samos Timaea, the widow of Agis II, whispered to her helot
maids at home that the name of her child was Alcibiades, thereby telling
the maids that the real father of Leotychides was the famous Alcibiades.
Here is yet another instance not just of a personal, but even of an intimate
relationship between a royal person and her helots. Timaea may have had
close friends and confidantes among the wives and women from the
Spartiate class, but no source says that she did. In any case she had no
hesitation to reveal the true paternity of her child to her helot servants. It
is not impossible too, that the maids spread this information to others, so
that Timaea wittingly or unwittingly intervened in the struggle for
succession to the detriment of her own son, for Leotychides was denied
the throne of his nominal father56. By an odd coincidence it was a king of
the same name, Leotychides II, who provoked Demaratus to ask his mother,
the widow of king Ariston about his true parentage and to deny the
allegation by Leotychides that she had had an affair with a muleteer, who,
as a servant in the house, must be a helot. The value of this story in
Herodotus is amply discussed and rightly questioned by the standard
commentators; still, its existence supports the view of an easy familiarity
of the monarchs with their helot servants57.
52 FgrHist 115 Theopomp. F22=Athen. XIV.657b-c; Plut. Agesil. 36.6=Mor. 210b-c.
53 By DUCAT J. Le mépris des Hilotes // Annales. 1974. Vol. 30. P. 1451–1464.
passim; IDEM. Les Hilotes. P. 10. Ducat tends to explain far too much in the
relations between Spartans and helots as Spartan contempt for the latter.
54 Spartan army rations: LAZENBY. The Spartan Army. P. 34.
55 Xen. Hell. III.3.1–2.                                  
56 Plut. Agesil. 3.1 sq.
57 Hdt. VI.61–69; cf. HOW AND WELLS, MACAN, AND H. STEIN. Herodotos.
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The successor to Agis was to be decided by Apollo, but the oracular
pronouncement was ambiguous, and its meaning was disputed. A
professional and experienced chresmologue named Diopeithes interpreted
the oracle in favor of Leotychides. Plutarch describes the seer as the
custodian of ancient prophecies, who was regarded as very wise. He
quotes the oracle, which suggests that he had more detailed information
than Xenophon, who does not, and that therefore his report rests on an
early source. Evidently the succession crisis was so acute and the struggle
between the two contenders so well known that an extensive record of it
existed to which the biographer had access. In the end Lysander’s
interpretation of the oracle was accepted by the state (the polis, as
Xenophon puts it, presumably meaning the assembly)58. Despite his election,
however, the king’s position from the very beginning rested on a disputed
Delphic pronouncement and so was not completely secure. His kingship
appears to have remained somewhat shaky for a while after his accession,
for despite his military successes Agesilaos later on had to contend with
intrigues and machinations against him. His tenuous hold on the throne is
both suggested and explained by the punctilious obedience he showed to
the ephors: he worked to win their favor by rising from his seat when
ephors visited him. He also worked to win the favor of the gerousia,
sending newly elected senators a coat and an ox as a mark of honor, and
made great efforts in other ways to attract a large following and to rule as
a populist king. Plutarch says that the ephors feared his power and fined
him because ‘he had made his own the citizens who should belong to the
state.’ If Plutarch is right, Agesilaos had egalitarian views, reformist plans,
and perhaps even revolutionary intentions59.
All this suggests that Agesilaos may have been implicated in the
conspiracy of Cinadon. What Xenophon says about the conspiracy points
in the same direction. The succession crisis was closely connected with
the plot; Xenophon certainly implies such a connection by reporting both
events in immediate succession of each other as a continuous account in
the Hellenica60. There is no overt statement in Xenophon’s history of the
king’s complicity, but this is to be expected from a historian to whom
Agesilaos was a hero, whose encomiastic biography he wrote, and whom
he would have been reluctant to portray as conspiring with slaves and
other members of the lower classes. But what Xenophon says between
the lines, so to speak, makes a plausible case for the king’s connivance in
the conspiracy.
Dublin, Zurich, 1969. Vol. VI ad loc.
58 Xen. Hell. 3.3 sq.
59 Xen. Agesil. I.18 sq.; 36; VI.4; Plut. Agesil. 4.1 sq.; 3; 5.1 sq.; 10.5; 17.1. MI-
CHELL. Op. cit. P. 127.
60 CARTLEDGE. Sparta and Lakonia. P. 234; Xen. Hell. III.3.4–11.
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Agesilaos had been king for less than a year, and probably for a
rather short time, when the conspiracy came to light. He learned about it
while he was engaged in one of the public sacrifices regularly performed
by the kings on behalf of the state, in keeping with ancient custom. In the
course of the ceremony Agesilaos was told by the attending seer that the
gods revealed a terrible plot. The king thereupon offered a second sacrifice,
but the seer declared that the signs were even more terrible than before.
At the third sacrifice the signs were ‘as if we were in the midst of the
enemy.’ When the two of them finally obtained favorable omens, they did
so with great difficulty. This somewhat elliptical and murky account
contains several curious features. First, as the sacrifice was public, and
was attended by others besides Agesilaos and the seer61, the seer must
have told the king what the omens meant privately and in a low voice
audible only to him. This means that no other person present heard him;
had others heard him, the conspiracy would have been revealed on the
spot, rather than later. Xenophon appears to be saying that the seer was
not so much informing Agesilaos about a conspiracy as warning him that
it might be revealed, as in fact it was to the ephors five days later. Secondly,
the seer, Tisamenus, was one of the conspirators, for he too was arrested
eventually62. The third feature is the most curious and damning: it is the
inaction of Agesilaos. Despite three repeated warnings, and a fourth not
wholly satisfactory response, the king failed to take any steps to look into
the threatening danger, nor did he, as he could have done at the very least,
inform the ephors of what he had learned at the sacrificial ceremony. His
behavior suggests that, like his early predecessor, the regent Pausanias,
Agesilaos had been a silent partner in a plot involving many members of
the underclass, including the helots. Knowing that his succession was
disputed and uncertain Agesilaos evidently had been preparing an alternate
path to the throne, and after he became king chose not to act against his
allies, perhaps because his populist convictions agreed with the aim of
Cinadon’s conspiracy, which was equal rights for all. In view of all this
the seer’s words ‘we are in the midst of the enemy’ become ambiguous;
‘the enemy’ may have been the other Spartans who were present at the
sacrifice.
While this conclusion may be somewhat hypothetical, the reaction of
the ephors to the plot, like the inaction of Agesilaos, is a fact adding
considerable weight to the possibility of Agesilaos’ complicity. Since they
did not know the extent of the plot the ephors, when they learned about it
from an informer, were careful to conceal their knowledge from others,
61 Hdt. VI.57.1; a large number of people was also present when the king offered
sacrifices in his capacity as general, Xen. Lac. 13.4 sq.
62 Cf.: ROBAERT A. Le danger hilote? // Ktema. 1977. Vol. 2. P. 153 f.; the identity
seems correct in view of the definite article with µντιν at Xen. Hell. III.3.11.
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including Agesilaos. They did not convene the ‘little assembly,’ almost
certainly the gerousia, where Agesilaos would also be present; instead
each ephor gathered senators around him wherever he found them to
devise countermeasures with them63.
There is a further consideration. A circumstantial but quite plausible
case has been made recently that ‘Cinadon was the “fall guy” for someone
far more powerful than himself, namely Lysander’64, who, as already
mentioned, at the time of the conspiracy was not only the ally of Agesilaos
in the struggle for the succession, but his chief champion and the man
who, in effect, made Agesilaos king. If the hypothesis of Cinadon as the
‘fall guy’ is correct, and it is quite attractive, Lysander may have acted on
behalf of Agesilaos and as his agent. Cinadon, then, ultimately may have
been the ‘fall guy’ for Agesilaos himself.
Lysander too, as Plutarch tells us, had been entertaining hopes of
reforming the Spartan kingship, and very probably had been looking for
allies to help him carry out his designs. Upon capturing Sestos from the
Athenians, he expelled its population and gave the city and its territory to
the helmsmen and boatswains from the 200 ships under his command to
live in and to cultivate. These 400 men and any of the oarsmen who may
also have been allowed to settle in Sestos were probably helots, for as
Xenophon tells us, in the Spartan fleets the trierarchs and perhaps the
marines were Spartan citizens, but the oarsmen were either helots or
mercenaries. Here too, it seems, we have an able Spartan commander
successful in warfare who also had reformist ambitions at home and
therefore tried to attract a helot following with gifts, even as the regent
Pausanias had done earlier and Agesilaos was to do later65.
In the third century several Spartan kings worked to reform the social
and economic structures of the state. Agis IV wished to cancel debts and
to redistribute land66. The sources report great opposition to his reforms,
but whether or not the lower classes, including the helots, were affected
by his program is unknown. Perhaps it is at least interesting that, like the
regent Pausanias long before him, Agis IV was forced to seek refuge in
63 Xen. Hell. III.3.8.
64 LAZENBY J.F. The Conspiracy of Kinadon Reconsidered // Athenaeum. 1997.
Vol. 85. P. 438.
65 Plut. Lys. 14.2;  Xen. Hell.  VII.1.12. See: WELWEI. Op. cit. P. 159 f. for evidence
and strong arguments for helot oarsmen on other occasions, including the
battle at the Arginusae Islands. Lysander’s efforts to attain political power in
Sparta are studied with great acumen and thoroughness by Frolov: ÔÐÎËÎÂ
Ý.Ä. Èç ïðåäûñòîðèè ìëàäøåé òèðàíèè (Ñòîëêíîâåíèå ëè÷íîñòè è
ãîñóäàðñòâà â Ñïàðòå íà ðóáåæå V–IV ñòîëåòèé äî í. ý.) // ÂÄÈ. 1972. ¹ 2.
Ñ. 22–40.
66 CARTLEDGE and SPAWFORTH. Op. cit. P. 45 f.; SHIMRON B. Late Sparta. Buf-
falo, N.Y., 1972. P. 19.
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the temple of Athena Chalkioikos. When the other king, Leonidas, was
deposed and exiled he was succeeded by Cleombrotus II, who had been
made king by the party of Agis. Cleombrotus remained on the throne until
the return of Leonidas, when he too, echoing Pausanias, went to the precinct
of Poseidon at Taenarum, the traditional place of worship for the helots,
to seek asylum there67. It is legitimate to ask why he chose Taenarum; the
answer may be that the distance from Sparta-town afforded greater safety.
Another, perhaps more plausible answer may be that the helots had been
involved in the power struggles on the side of the reformers in some way,
and that in their precinct Cleombrotus could rely on the helots’ services
and protection.
Sparta’s internal situation in this period differed from what it had
been in the fifth century and during much of the fourth. The kings now
governed the state, ruled the entire population and wrestled with its
problems, not always without some opposition. Still, the fact remains that
once again it was the kings who dealt with the helots en masse and made
an effort to alter their condition, thereby echoing, or perhaps even
consciously continuing the efforts of some of their predecessors.
Cleomenes III, acting virtually as an absolute ruler, liberated 5,000 helots,
whom, however, he charged a fee for their freedom. He also armed 2,000
of them, and may have enfranchised the lot fully, although modern opinion
differs on this last point68. About a quarter of century later one of his
successors, Nabis, not only liberated many helots, he also enfranchised
them, and gave them land which had belonged to their former masters. He
also inducted them into the army, and even went so far as to give them
Spartan women as wives. Nabis did not abolish the institution of helotry,
but he evidently completed the reforms begun by Cleomenes III69.
The dozen or so royals and their non-royal surrogates and
counterparts, the commoners commanding Spartan forces abroad,
represent a relatively small number of men in such positions about whom
we have information. But they seem enough to suggest that kings and
helots stood in a special relationship with each other, especially when both
served on campaigns beyond Sparta’s borders. This circumstance may
explain in part the contradiction that the helots, while kept down at home,
gave good and loyal service in war abroad: they were fighting for the
king, who claimed their loyalty and to whom the helots in turn owed
allegiance. This loyalty, as was suggested above, the helots could transfer
to Spartan commoners of extraordinary ability and qualities of leadership.
67 Plut. Agis. 16.3.
68 SHIMRON. Op. cit. P. 44; 50; 95; CHRIMES K.M.T. Ancient Sparta. Manchester,
1952. P. 33 f.; 40.
69 SHIMRON. Op. cit. P. 86; 89; 90–97; 121; 127; IDEM. Nabis of Sparta and the
Helots // CPh. 1966. Vol. 61. P. 1–7.
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The transfer seems to have been made almost automatically, by men, and
especially the veterans among them, to whom obeying orders had become
a second nature in their service in the army.
It remains to answer the question, to the extent that the evidence
allows, why some Spartan kings found it necessary to involve the helots
in their plans. Among the kings discussed above are several of the abler
and more ambitious men who set out to play a larger role in the internal
political and social affairs of Sparta than the role accorded them by the
Lycurgan order. About one half of them are the same royal persons whom
some modern scholars place into a superior group, as for instance does
Thomas, who rightly concludes that these kings could be successful as
statesmen only if they possessed great personal charisma, exceptional
powers of leadership, or had proved themselves to be victorious generals;
the kings who did not distinguish themselves as military commanders
could not succeed as leaders or reformers inside Sparta70. The same
prerequisite for political power, success in war, surely also had to be met
by ambitious commoners such as Lysander.
 However, even the ablest and most energetic of the kings faced
enormous difficulties in their efforts to achieve their ends of greater domestic
political power and authority. There appear to be two chief reasons for
this. First, the kings lacked a political and social base among the Spartiate
population on which they could rely for help to maintain the monarchy as
an institution while trying enact any political and social reforms that they
might have had in mind. Nor could they always count on the support of
either of the two assemblies. Secondly, they always faced the opposition
of the established government.
One might suppose that the political power base of ambitious kings
ought to have been the Spartan peers, but it appears that there was a
considerable distance separating royals and commoners. In the sphere of
religion their divine descent set the kings apart from their subjects. As
kings they also stood apart and above the rest socially. Spartan heirs to the
throne were not educated in the agoge, which also set them apart from
their subjects. A distance is visible even in the routine details in the conduct
of daily life: although they may have done so, the kings were not required
to dine with their subjects in the common messes, and special provisions
were in place to take food to their residences when they chose to take
70 THOMAS C.G. On the Role of the Spartan Kings // Historia. 1974. Bd 23. P. 260,
262 f., 270. Thomas in p. 262 lists the Spartan kings who in her opinion were
the more successful in gaining their political ends. Jones (JONES A.H.M.
Sparta. Cambridge, Mass., 1967. P. 16) has a similar list which generally agrees
with Thomas;’ he adds a list of the leading commoners who in some way
affected Spartan policy. About half of the kings named on both lists had the
connections and dealings with the helots described in this paper.
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their meals there. This distance between royals and commoners is
particularly well illustrated by the contrary case of Agesilaos: the Spartans
liked him, and wished to have him as king because, unlike their other
kings, he had been reared with them in the agoge, and had been trained to
obey as well as to command71.
 It is furthermore not clear that the commons were always the political
allies of the kings. If we may generalize from the evidence about Agesilaos,
even a popular king could not take the allegiance of the populace for
granted, but had to work hard and act in an extraordinary and un-Greek
manner to win the good will and trust of the Spartans. In an effort to
conciliate his enemies Agesilaos did not retaliate against them for the injuries
they had done him, on the other hand he connived at the wrong-doing of
his friends to keep them on his side; he even made an effort to gain the
allegiance of the poorer among his own relatives to whom he distributed
one-half of his estates72.
In the gerousia the kings had no more power than the rest of the
senators; they had only one vote each73. The senators used the kings to
maintain the political equilibrium, joining the kings to counteract democratic
movements, and taking the side of the populace against them to oppose
any autocratic tendencies in the kings. For the rest, if we may believe our
ancient authorities, the Spartan senate distrusted the power of the kings
nearly as much as did the ephors; Plutarch mentions both in the same
breath as powerful opponents of the kings74.
To understand fully the position of the kings facing such opposition,
it may be useful to recollect how often the sources, early and late, mention
the dominance of both ephors and gerousia and their opposition to the
kings. Some pieces of information in the evidence may perhaps not be
very important in themselves, but in the aggregate they acquire considerable
weight. In ascending order of importance we hear that only the ephors
did not rise when a king appeared, that they had the power to summon the
kings before them, and that they could interfere in the decisions of a king.
They could also fine him, evict him from the country, and declare him an
outlaw and execute him without trial. Aristotle calls the ephors the enemies
of the kings (χϑ	ο) and says that they are so powerful that the kings
must carry favor with them: a king was a king in name only; all the power
in the state belonged to the ephors75. Plutarch asserts that the ephors and
the senators had the greatest power in the state and that Lycurgus instituted
71 Plut. Agesil. 3.3.
72 Plut. Agesil. 5.1 sq.; 4.1.
73 Thuc. I.20.3.
74 Plut. Agesil. 4.2.
75 Thuc. I.131.1; Xen. Lac. 15.6; Agesil. I.36;  Arist. Pol. II.9.1271a19–26; 1270b
11–17; Plut. Lyc. 5.6; 7.1; Agesil. 2.3; Cleom. 3.2.
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the ephorate and the gerousia for the specific purpose of restraining the
power of the kings. From the beginning and then from generation to
generation the kings were always feuding and wrangling with the ephors
and the gerousia76.
In view of the forces arrayed against them the kings had no choice
but to turn to the underprivileged and subject segments of the population,
most particularly the helots, the most numerous such class, to seek wider
support for their foreign policy plans and domestic programs. The result
was the collaboration described above: kings could make common cause
with the helots, including the veterans of their campaigns, in an effort to
realize their personal political ambitions. The danger that this complicity
presented to the civil government of the ephors and the gerousia is obvious.
Both bodies met it with wariness and suspicion. There is a good chance
that ephors accompanied armies in the field not only to guard against
personal and political royal misconduct, or royal military and diplomatic
incompetence. An additional reason for their oversight was the possibility
of royal collaboration with the helots.
 Xenophon emphasizes the mistrust when he says that the kings and
the ephors exchanged oaths every month. The kings swore to reign in
accordance with the established laws, the ephors took an oath to maintain
the monarchy in tact if the kings kept their promise77. The historian credits
Lycurgus with the institution of the exchange, but it may well be that the
oaths were exchanged with especial regularity in the fifth and fourth
centuries as a precaution against the machinations by the kings. Plutarch
quoting Aristotle as his source reports that the ephors declared war against
the helots every year. The phrase that he uses, πλµον αταγγλλιν, is
the technical term for issuing a proscription against someone. It is significant
that according to Thucydides the same threat of a proscription (πλµον
π	οαγο	upsilonacuteιν) was used by the ephors against the regent Pausanias78 .
Plutarch likewise does not inform us whether the annual proscription was
ascribed to Lycurgus, or, as is likely, was a practice that was adopted
later. He does go on to quote Aristotle as saying that the declaration had
the purpose of avoiding the charge of sacrilege and blood pollution
whenever helots were killed. Aristotle, however, may have been making
an inference from the notorious disappearance of the 2000 helots in
Thucydides already mentioned above. One may doubt that declaring war
upon them was meant to provide legitimacy for periodic wholesale
massacres of capable young helots. Such massacres were clearly against
76 Plut. Agesil. 4.2.
77 Xen. Lac. 15.7.
78 Plut. Lyc. 8.4; Thuc. I.131.1. See the thorough discussion by Parshikov (ÏÀÐ-
ØÈÊÎÂ A.Å. Ïàâñàíèé è ïîëèòè÷åñêàÿ áîðüáà â Ñïàðòå // ÂÄÈ. 1968. ¹ 1.
Ñ. 130 ñë.).
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the interests of the Spartans who needed the helots for service in the
army, and in any case there is no evidence, apart from the episode in
Thucydides, for such mass murders79. The declaration as a public enemy
clearly was a precautionary measure aimed directly at the helots themselves;
but it may at the same time have been directed obliquely against the kings
as well, as a way of preventing royal complots. If a king conspired with
an enemy of the state, and was caught at it, he became an enemy of the
state himself; this is precisely what would have happened to the regent
Pausanias, had he not returned. With the declaration of war against the
helots in effect, a royal person entering into a conspiracy with them could
be dealt with more easily than it had been in the case against the regent
Pausanias, whose quasi-execution at the temple of Athena of the Bronze
House later embroiled the Spartans in religious and political difficulties.
An ancient tradition of moderate reliability maintains that, like the
helots, the Spartan kings too traced their ancestry to the pre-Dorian Bronze
Age population. As the evidence for this claim is not ironclad80, modern
scholarship has either denied the Achaean origin of the Agiad and Eurypontid
dynasties outright, or has sought a compromise with the hypothesis that
one of the royal houses was pre-Dorian, and the other was not81. If the
79  This is the general conclusion of ROBAERT. Op. cit. P. 141–155; cf. p. 150.
80 Hdt. VI. 51–55; cf.: I.67 sq.; VII.159.
81 The compromise position is that of MACAN. Op. cit. P. 309 f. on Hdt. VI.51.
Macan has been anticipated by Wachsmuth, cf.: HOW AND WELLS II 1989.
P. 82f., who regard the Achaean origin of the kings as ‘a fiction invented to
justify the Dorian conquest’. On the whole, however, the evidence seems to
support an Achaean descent of the kings; it includes some similar activities
shared by the Homeric and Spartan kings. Both were leaders in war, and both
had important priestly functions. Apart from the difference of inhumation
there are also some parallels between the funeral rites for Homeric heroes
and those for Spartan kings as Herodotus describes them, such as the many
mourners who defile their bodies at the passing of the king and the transport
of the dead man home on a richly decorated bier. Aristotle too seems to
regard the Spartan monarchy as having its origin in the distant time of the
Homeric heroes, for he draws a parallel between the powers of the Homeric
and Spartan kings.  Hom. Il. XVI. 670–674; XVIII. 22–31; XXII.405–409; XXIV.
715–724; Hdt. VI.58.1–3. Arist. Pol. III.14.1285a3–14; MICHELL.  Op. cit. P. 105.
It is not necessary to assume that these similarities are due to a copying of
practices described in the Homeric sagas; they may well be the product of a
common recollection of a distant past transmitted in oral traditions. Eventually,
how ever, the epic began to contribute to the posthumous heroization of the
kings. See Snodgrass’ study (SNODGRASS A. The Archaeology of the Hero
// Oxford Readings in Greek Religion. Ed. by R.Buxton. Oxf., 2000. P. 180–190) of
the interconnections between cults of heroes in the sagas and cults of he-
roes who were real persons. Snodgrass adduces the elevation to heroic status
after his death of the early Spartan king Teleklos (Paus. III.15.10) as an example.
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Á. Äæîðäàí
Çà ïîñëåäíèå 20–30 ëåò ïîÿâèëàñü öåëàÿ ñåðèÿ ñåðüåçíûõ èññëåäîâàíèé, â
êîòîðûõ ðàññìàòðèâàþòñÿ êàê ñïàðòàíñêèå öàðè, òàê è ñïàðòàíñêèå èëîòû.
Âïðî÷åì, âîïðîñû, ñâÿçàííûå ñ ïðîèñõîæäåíèåì, õàðàêòåðîì, ìåñòîì â
ëàêåäåìîíñêîì ñîöèóìå äàííûõ äâóõ êàòåãîðèé îáû÷íî äèñêóòèðóþòñÿ
îòäåëüíî äðóã îò äðóãà. Â äàííîé ñòàòüå ïðåäïðèíÿòà ïîïûòêà ñîáðàòü
ìàòåðèàë ïèñüìåííûõ èñòî÷íèêîâ, êîòîðûé äàåò îñíîâàíèå ïðåäïîëàãàòü
íàëè÷èå îñîáîé ñâÿçè ìåæäó öàðÿìè è èëîòàìè, à òàêæå èíòåðïðåòèðîâàòü
ýòè ñâèäåòåëüñòâà. Áëèæàéøåå è òùàòåëüíîå ðàññìîòðåíèå ñîáðàííûõ äàí-
íûõ ïîçâîëèëî ñäåëàòü íåêîòîðûå âûâîäû, êîòîðûå ïðîëèâàþò íîâûé ñâåò
íå òîëüêî íà âçàèìîîòíîøåíèÿ ýòèõ äâóõ êàòåãîðèé, íî òàêæå è íà õàðàêòåð
öàðñêîé âëàñòè â Ñïàðòå è íà ïðèðîäó ñïàðòàíñêîé èëîòèè.
tradition of an Achaean ancestry of Sparta’s kings is not historical, its
existence raises the question why it was invented and by whom. The
answer may well be that it was invented to explain the collaboration in
historical times between kings and helots of which, as we have seen, the
evidence, limited though it is, affords a fairly good glimpse. It is impossible
to know who the authors and promoters of the tradition were, whether it
was an invention of the kings who wished to display themselves to the
helots as their natural champions, or of the political adversaries of the
kings, who wanted to use it as a weapon against subversive royals, and
saw it as a way of justifying strong measures against them. Whatever the
truth of any of this, kings and helots appear to have been linked together
strongly enough to ascribe a common origin to both. The tradition about
this origin was very much alive in the historical period, and so powerful
that one of the kings who had particularly close dealings with his helots,
Cleomenes I, could retort to the priestess of Athena on the Athenian
Acropolis: ‘Madam, I am not a Dorian, I am an Achaean’82.
The reminiscence of the Achaean kings in Homer too may have given rise to
the deification of Spartan kings; cf.: Hdt. VI.58; Xen. Lac. 15.2; 15.9.
82 Hdt. V.72.3.
